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Switching between mental sets has been extensively investigated in both experimental and individual 
differences research using a wide range of task-switch paradigms. However, it is yet unclear whether these 
different tasks measure a unitary shifting ability or reflect different facets thereof. In this study, 20 task pairs 
were administered to 119 young adults to assess 5 proposed components of mental set shifting: switching 
between judgments, stimulus dimensions, stimulus–response mappings, response sets, and stimulus sets. 
Modeling latent factors for each of the components revealed that a model with 5 separate yet mostly correlated 
factors fit the data best. In this model, the components most strongly related to the other latent factors were 
stimulus–response mapping shifting and, to a lesser degree, response set shifting. In addition, both factors were 
statistically indistinguishable from a second-order general shifting factor. In contrast, shifting between 
judgments as well as stimulus dimensions consistently required separate factors and could, hence, not fully be 
accounted for by the general shifting factor. Finally, shifting between stimulus sets was unrelated to any other 
shifting component but mapping shifting. We conclude that tasks assessing shifting between mappings are most 
adequate to assess general shifting ability. In contrast, shifting between stimulus sets (e.g., as in the Trail 
Making Test) probably reflects shifts in visual attention rather than executive shifting ability. 
Keywords: 
task switching, individual differences, executive functions, unity and diversity 
It is common experience that we rarely focus on only one activity at the time uninterruptedly. Rather, most of 
our daily life involves several things going on in quick succession or even concurrently. For example, while 
driving a car, we may simultaneously listen to music, quickly shift our attention from the street to the navigation 
system, and back on the road in an attempt to orient in an unfamiliar city. The mental processes behind such task 
switching and multitasking are obviously complex and have been one of the main topics in cognitive research of 
the last decades. Terms as, for instance, executive functions, cognitive control, or mental flexibility have been 
used to refer to the set of “shifting abilities” required in such situations, and many different paradigms have been 
developed to experimentally investigate these skills (e.g., Logan, 1985; Pashler, 2000). 
Set shifting abilities have also been of central interest in individual differences studies and studies on so-called 
frontal-lobe functions (e.g., Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Miyake et al., 2000). In these contexts, tasks have 
frequently been used that already have a long tradition in the assessment of frontal-executive functioning such 
as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and its derivatives, or the Trail Making Test (TMT). 
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In the present study, we try to bridge the two fields by using an individual differences approach and tasks 
designed in the field of experimental task-switching research to disentangle the commonalities and differences 
in switching our attention between different representational sets in an attempt to search for a common 
underlying shifting ability. Before outlining the details of our study, though, we first give a short overview of 
the literature regarding the typical tasks used in experimental studies and the question of what characterizes task 
(sets). Next, we consider individual differences studies of mental set shifting. Here, we primarily focus on the 
tasks that have been used to assess shifting abilities. Integrating these two parts, we then sketch a first heuristic 
model which guided the design of the present study. 
 
Task Switching and the Conceptualization of Task Sets 
 
Since the seminal studies by Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994), and Rogers and Monsell (1995), several task-
switch paradigms have been established. The most extensively used is the task-cuing paradigm, in which 
participants perform a random sequence of at least two tasks. The relevant task on a given individual trial is 
indicated by a cue that is presented some time before the onset of the actual target stimulus (cue-target interval 
[CTI]). Usually, the stimuli presented afford both tasks (i.e., are bivalent) as, for instance, in the case where 
digits are presented that have to be classified according to either their parity or magnitude. Also, in most studies, 
the same responses are used for both tasks; hence there is a response-set overlap between tasks (e.g., even digits 
and digits smaller than 5 require pressing a left key, and odd digits and digits larger than 5 require pressing a 
right key). Figure 1 depicts an exemplar two-trial switch sequence in this type of paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 1 Exemplar two-trial task-switch sequence in a typical cued task-switch experiment. 
 
Typically, participants respond faster to target stimuli in trials in which the previous task repeats than to target 
stimuli in trials in which the task switches (e.g., Koch, 2001; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The 
difference in response time (RT) or error rate between repetition and switch trials in mixed-task blocks are the 
switch costs. Despite being the main focus of task-switch research, there is still much debate about the processes 
contributing to the switch costs (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
Verbruggen, 2010). Most researchers agree though on these costs being caused by multiple processes. Attempts 
to model the temporal dynamics in task switch situations (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran, 2000a; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002, 2005) typically emphasize two main sources of switch costs: 
(the lack of) advance task preparation and carry-over effects from the previous task (i.e., proactive interference). 
 
The conceptualizations of what constitutes a task (set) are similarly diverse. Mayr and Keele (2000), for 
example, suggested that “task sets are assumed to specify the configuration of perceptual, attentional, 
mnemonic, and motor processes critical for a particular task goal” (p. 5), thereby highlighting the relevance of 
cognitive parameter settings in situations with ambiguous stimulus input, but where a specific goal is to be 
reached. Such processing-related conceptualizations of task sets are typical for formal models of task switching 
(e.g., in the parallel distributed processing-model [PDP-model] by Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; in executive control 
of the theory visual attention [i.e., ECTVA], Logan & Gordon, 2001; in control by action representation and 
input selection [i.e., CARIS], Meiran et al., 2008). 
 
Other attempts to specify the concept of task sets focus on structural rather than functional aspects. Kleinsorge 
and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004), for example, suggested a hierarchical structure of task representations with 
four main task features. We consider this model in more detail here, as it is central to our study. The four main 
task features Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) suggested are judgments, dimensions, mappings, 
and responses. On the top level, the task set hierarchy encompasses the judgments (i.e., parity and magnitude in 
the above example). Subordinate to the judgments are the stimulus dimensions (i.e., the digit values) and the 
stimulus–response mappings (i.e., even digits and digits smaller than 5 are assigned to pressing a left key, and 
odd digits and digits larger than 5 are assigned to pressing a right key). At the lowest level of the task hierarchy 
are the responses (i.e., the key presses and their mental representations). 
 
In the present study, we adopted the structural task-set conceptualization provided by Kleinsorge and Heuer 
(1999; Kleinsorge,2004). Different than experimental research on the temporal structure of basic selection  
processes contributing to the switch costs (e.g., see Meiran, 2000a; Meiran et al., 2008; Rushworth et al., 2002, 
2005), we were interested in how different shifting components are related from an individual differences 
perspective, thereby identifying which elements of a task possibly require the contribution of a general shifting 
ability. For this purpose, we classified tasks that have been used in previous experimental task-switching 
research into categories according to the task feature that had to be switched. Figure 2 illustrates the involved 
representational changes in task-switch trials for each of these task features as well as for an additional feature 
we included (see the following text). 
 
 
Figure 2 Example two-choice task pairs for the five proposed shifting components: the four task-set features of Kleinsorge 
and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004), and the additional stimulus-set task feature. Depicted are the switch-transitions from 
one trial to the next (i.e., N-1 to N) on each task-set feature for the respective task pairs, with the critical switches for the 
respective component highlighted in gray. Note that, for methodological reasons, the exact stimulus–response mapping 
changes in all components except for dimension shifting. For all components, the two-choice task pair with the highest 
reliability is depicted (see text for more details).  
 
Task Switching and a General Shifting Ability: Individual Differences Approaches 
 
To our best knowledge, it has not yet been systematically investigated whether and, if so, which different types 
of shifting components of a task contribute to a common underlying shifting ability in an individual differences 
framework. However, a variety of shifting tasks has been used to assess the relationship between mental set 
shifting ability and other cognitive abilities such as inhibition, working memory, and fluid intelligence (e.g., 
Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; Süß, 
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). In these studies, shifting ability has been characterized as 
switching “back and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or mental sets” (Miyake et al., 2000, p. 55). 
Miyake and colleagues operationalized shifting ability with three different task pairs which they considered 
different enough to not engage exactly the same operations to be switched, but similar enough in that all require 
shifting between mental sets. The tasks they used were the plus–minus task from Jersild (1927), the number–
letter task from Rogers and Monsell (1995), and the global-local task (cf. R. Hübner, Futterer, & Steinhauser, 
2001). The results showed that these tasks indeed loaded well on one shifting factor, and that this factor was 
clearly separable from two other executive functions (“Inhibition” and “Updating”). Moreover, the shifting 
factor predicted performance in a frequently used “frontal-lobe” task, the WCST. 
 
Although these tasks share some crucial features as indicated by their correlations and the loading on one factor, 
they also differ in several respects when viewed from the perspective of the structural task-set framework 
proposed by Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004). For example, the judgment for the global and local 
shapes in the global-local task of Miyake et al. (2000) remained the same (i.e., naming the number of lines a 
shape is composed of) and shifting was only required for the level (global vs. local, i.e., the stimulus 
dimension). In contrast, in the number–letter task, participants switched between a letter judgment (vowel or 
consonant) and a digit judgment (odd or even) in a two-symbol display with one letter and one digit side-by-
side. 
 
In a similar vein, Oberauer and colleagues (2000; Süß et al.,2002) operationalized shifting with three different 
tasks with numerical, figural, and verbal material, respectively. The numerical task (previously used by Allport 
et al., 1994) required participants to switch between judging the value of a set of (identical) digits on a screen, 
and the number of digits presented. In the figural and the verbal tasks, participants had to decide on which side a 
round or angular shape was presented in a horizontally arranged two-stimulus display (figural task), or whether 
the left or right word in a two-word display belonged to a prespecified category. As the results showed, these 
three tasks were highly correlated and loaded on a common factor in a structural equation model, despite them 
covering different task features according to Kleinsorge and Heuer’s (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) task set 
framework. More specifically, whereas the numerical task required participants to shift between judgments, the 
judgments remained constant in the figural and verbal tasks. In these tasks, shifting was instead required 
between stimulus dimensions. 
 
To capture these commonalities and differences between the tasks, the present study attempts to extend the 
Kleinsorge (2004) and Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999) framework. In the following, we outline how switching 
tasks used in the context of experimental and individual differences studies map on such an extension of 
Kleinsorge’s framework in more detail. 
 
Types of Tasks and a First Model 
 
In experimental research, switching has been operationalized at all four representational levels (i.e., judgment, 
dimension, mapping, and response sets) of Kleinsorge and Heuer’s (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) framework. More 
specifically, experimental paradigms measured switching at the judgment level (as in the vast majority of task-
switch studies; e.g., Altmann, 2004; Arrington & Logan, 2004; Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; M. Hübner, 
Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez, & Peters, 2004; Koch, 2001; Lien, Schweickert, & Proctor, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; Logan, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2007; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 
2002; Oriet & Jolcœur, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schneider & Logan, 2006; Waszak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003), at the stimulus dimension level (e.g., R. Hübner et al., 2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000), at the level 
of the responses (in terms of response sets; e.g., Philipp & Koch, 2005), and at the level of (pure) stimulus–
response mappings (e.g.,Rushworth et al., 2002, 2005; Shaffer, 1965). 
 
Similarly, the shifting tasks that have been used in individual differences research vary across studies (see Table 
1 for a nonexhaustive overview), with the majority of tasks measuring judgment and dimension shifting. 
Interestingly, in many studies shifting has been operationalized by using the TMT (see Table 1). In the TMT’s 
critical Part B, participants have to alternately connect the numbers 1 to 12 and the letters A to L by a line (i.e., 
1A2B3C...). Such shifting between mere stimulus sets is not reflected in Kleinsorge and Heuer’s (1999; 
Kleinsorge, 2004) task set framework. Therefore, we added stimulus set shifting as a fifth representational level 
to our model (see Figure 2).1 
                                                          
1 Note that we use the term stimulus set only descriptively in the sense that participants shift between two different sets of 
stimuli. It is thus not related to the “S(timulus)-Set” concept used in Meiran’s (2000a) framework, where S-Sets play a 
functional role (in terms of selective attention) for the biasing of response selection. In later work (Meiran et al., 2008), 
Because of methodological constraints, different shifting components are inevitably often concurrently present 
when switching from one task to another. For example, exact stimulus–response (SR) mapping shifts are 
immanently present in tasks measuring all other components, except only those requiring pure stimulus 
dimension shifts (Mayr, 2002; Mayr & Keele, 2000; see also Figure2). Similarly, stimuli are necessarily bivalent 
(i.e., afford both tasks) in any shifting component other than the one measuring pure stimulus set shifting. Thus, 
measuring pure mapping and pure stimulus set shifting and including them as latent factors in the model allowed 
for examining how much influence these components exert on the (necessarily) less pure judgment, dimension, 
and response set shifting components. Furthermore, regarding the mapping shifting component, inclusion is also 
indicated for theoretical reasons. In his working memory (WM) model, Oberauer (2009) assumed that the costs 
observed under task-switch conditions are mainly due to the trial-by-trial (un-)loading of the stimulus–response 
mappings. Hence, according to this model, the mappings are a key component regarding mental set shifting 
ability. 
 
Present Study 
 
In this study, we used different task pairs from previous experimental task-switch research in an individual 
differences approach to answer the following research questions: (a) to what extent can the proposed five 
shifting components be constituted as separable factors and how are they interrelated, and (b) can these 
interrelations be accounted for by an underlying general shifting ability? For this purpose, for each of the five 
components, we adapted four tasks from the literature or, in cases where we did not find adequate tasks, created 
new ones. 
 
According to previous evidence, we expected switch costs for all five components, possibly with the exception 
of stimulus set shifting, as this component presumably only requires shifting of visual-spatial and not of 
executive attention (cf. Miyake et al., 2000). Figure 3 illustrates the basic versions of a respective series of 
models we tested to answer our research questions. The measurement model (see Figure 3A) served to evaluate 
the separability of latent factors reflecting the five theoretically assumed shifting components and their 
correlations. The hierarchical models (see Figure 3B) served to test the notion of a general shifting ability 
accounting for variance across shifting components. For this purpose, we modeled a second-order general 
shifting factor with loadings from the latent component factors. Finally, the bifactor (sometimes also referred to 
as nested-factor) models (see Figure 3C) served to explore whether any of the shifting components constitutes 
variance over and above a general shifting factor. Therefore, here, we modeled component-specific factors in 
addition to a general shifting factor, allowing for the measures to load on both. 
 
In addition, for each component, two tasks were selected that involved two response options (most common in 
experimental task switch research), one task with three response options, and one task with four response 
options (as there are also task-switch studies with more than two response options). Moreover, across the five 
components, we used both figural and verbal-numerical materials. This allowed us to test two alternative task-
driven models based on the number of response options (2, 3, or 4) and the stimulus materials (verbal–numerical 
or figural). 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
We aimed at collecting data from at least 120 participants. We determined the sample size based on previous 
individual differences studies by members of our laboratory (Oberauer et al., 2000; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Wittmann, 2003; von Bastian & Oberauer, 2013; von Bastian, Souza, & Gade, 2016; see Discussion for a 
further consideration of power). We recruited 127 students from the University of Zurich, Switzerland, who 
either received course credit or 50 CHF in exchange for their participation. As our primary dependent variable 
was based on RTs to correct responses, we excluded eight participants who performed below the predetermined 
threshold of proportion correct responses dependent on the number of response options (75% for two-choice 
tasks, 66.7% for three-choice tasks, and 62.5% for four-choice tasks), resulting in a final sample size of 119 (94  
                                                          
Meiran abandoned this terminology, using “input set” instead. The same restriction pertains to the “R(esponse)-Set” concept 
in Meiran (2000a), which was later changed to “action set” (Meiran et al., 2008). In contrast, we use the term response set in 
a structural-descriptive sense, referring to separate sets (chunks) of responses. 
 
 Table 1 Individual Differences Studies of Shifting (Nonexhaustive) 
Study 
 
Task 
 
Shifting type 
 
Adrover-Roig et al. (2012) Brixton Testa 
Madrid Card Sorting Testa 
TMT 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
Agostino et al. (2010) Contingency naming task 
TMT 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
de Frias et al. (2009) Brixton Testa 
Color Trails Testb 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
Fisk and Sharp (2004) WCST Judgment 
Fournier-Vicente et al. (2008) Plus-minus task 
Number-letter task 
Global-local 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Dimension 
Fuhs and Day (2011) Flexible item selectionc Judgment 
Hedden and Yoon (2006) Plus-minus task 
WCST 
TMT 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
Huizinga et al. (2006) Local-global 
Dots-triangles 
Smiling faces 
Dimension 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Hull et al. (2008) Global-local nonverbal 
Global-local verbal 
Plus-minus task 
WCST 
Dimension 
Dimension 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Lee et al. (2013, 2012) Picture-symbol task Judgment 
Lehto et al. (2003) TMT Stimulus set 
McCabe et al. (2010) WCST 
Mental controlb 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
Miller et al. (2012) DCCST Judgment 
Miyake et al. (2000) Plus-minus task 
Number-letter task 
Global-local 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Dimension 
Reimers and Maylor (2005) Gender-emotion switching Judgment 
Ropovik (2014) TMT 
WCST 
Stimulus set 
Judgment 
Rose et al. (2011) TMT 
Intra-/extradimensionalc 
Stimulus set 
Judgment 
Salthouse (2005) WCST 
TMT 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
van der Sluis et al. (2007 Objects shifting 
Symbol shifting 
Place shifting 
TMT 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
van der Ven et al. (2012) Animal shifting 
TMT 
Sorting taskc 
Judgment 
Stimulus set 
Judgment 
Vaughan and Giovanello (2010) Number-letter 
Global-local 
Parity-magnitude 
Judgment 
Dimension 
Judgment 
Willoughby et al. (2010) Item selection task Judgment 
Willoughby et al. (2012) Something’s the samec Judgment 
 
Note: TMT = Trail Making Test; WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; DCCST = Dimensional Change Card Sort Test. 
a Variant of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. b Variant of the Trail Making Test. c Variant of the Dimensional Change Card 
Sort Test. 
 
female, age M=23.08, SD=3.94; range=18–34 years). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and none of them exhibited color blindness as determined by Ishihara’s color test (Ishihara, 2003) 
. 
Apparatus 
 
Participants were tested in small groups of two to five in one session of approximately 3 to 4 hr duration. 
Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled by IBM-compatible PCs with a Windows 7 OS. 
The stimuli were presented on 19-in. color monitors (DELL 1905FP) with a resolution of 1280 x1024 pixels and 
a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The screen was located centrally on a desk in front of the participants and viewing 
distance was approximately 50 cm. The experiment was programmed using the Java-based software package 
Tatool (von Bastian, Locher, & Ruflin, 2013). All tasks and materials are available for download on Tatool Web 
(http://www.tatool-web.com/#/doc/main-lib.html). 
 
 
Figure 3 Baseline models for the series of models we investigated in this study. Rectangles denote manifest (observed) 
variables (i.e., switch costs from the respective task pairs); ellipses represent latent factors. Single-headed arrows denote 
linear regressions; double-headed arrows represent correlations. (A) Measurement model with the proposed five separable 
yet correlated shifting components. (B) Hierarchical model with a second-order general shifting factor with loadings from 
the latent component factors. (C) Bifactor model in which all tasks load on both a general shifting factor and on latent 
component-specific factors. J=judgment; D=dimension; M=mapping; RSet=response set; SSet=stimulus set. 
 
General Procedure 
 
For each shifting component (see Figure 3A), four task pairs were used (for an overview, see Table 2). Two of 
these task pairs were two-choice, one a three-choice, and one a four-choice task. Furthermore, we used a cuing 
procedure, which allowed for a pseudorandomized task order. The cues (see Figure 4) were presented centered 
above the target stimuli on a white background screen. The cues appeared with a CTI of 150ms before the target 
stimuli and remained on the screen during target presentation. The targets were presented centered on the 
screen. The target stimuli—along with the cues—remained on the screen until participants responded. After 
each trial, participants received immediate visual feedback (a green check mark or a red cross) about the 
correctness of their response. This feedback remained on screen for the full response-cue interval of 500 ms. For 
responding, participants had to press keys on a Swiss-German QWERTZ keyboard (see Table 2 for the details 
regarding each task). 
 
For each task pair, participants performed 24 practice trials (which were not further analyzed) and 144 
experimental trials. One half of the trials were repetition trials, and the other half of the trials were switch trials, 
with pseudorandomized order of repetition and switch trials. The task pairs for each shifting component were 
presented in blocks so that participants always performed all task pairs for a given component before switching 
to those of the next component. Across all shifting components and task pairs, two testing orders were 
established, that is, half of the participants performed the task pairs in the one order and the other half of  
participants in the reversed order (see Appendix, Table A1, for details). The task pairs within a shifting 
component were arranged in a way that participants always started and ended with one of the two-choice tasks, 
and the three- and four-choice tasks were administered in-between. 
 
 
Figure 4 Visual cues indicating the currently relevant task in the shifting task pairs along with the labels used for the task 
instructions given to participants. 
 
Tasks and Stimuli 
 
An overview of all task pairs along with the description of the stimuli used is given in Table 2. Judgment 
shifting task pairs required participants to switch between varying classification rules. For example, in the three-
choice task pair, participants had to determine either the color or the shape of objects presented. In dimension 
shifting task pairs, the classification rule remained the same, but participants had to switch between which of 
two stimulus dimensions to attend to. For example, in the Two-Choice B variant, character strings containing 
each a digit and a letter were presented. Participants had to attend to and identify the position of either the digit 
or the letter. In mapping shifting task pairs, participants had to switch between stimulus–response mappings. For 
example, in the four-choice task pair, the mathematical symbols for division (“÷”), multiplication (“x”), 
subtraction (“-”), and addition (“+”) were mapped to the keys V, B, N, and M, respectively. Depending on the 
cue, the mapping had to be reversed, so that “÷” was no longer mapped to V but to M instead.2 Response set 
shifting required participants to switch between two different sets of response keys. For example, in the three-
choice variant, participants had to determine whether a circle was solid black, solid gray, or empty, using either 
a horizontal key set A, S, and D, or a vertical key set on the numeric pad consisting of 8, 5, and 2. In the stimulus 
set shifting task pairs, the stimulus material switched depending on the cue displayed. As a consequence, 
different from the other shifting task pairs administered, stimulus set shifting involved univalent stimuli. For 
example, in the Two-Choice A task pair, participants were asked to classify either shapes (triangle, diamond, 
circle or ellipse) or symbols(“√,” “±,” “∞,” or “≈”) as being round or angular.
                                                          
2 Piloting of the test battery showed that the three- and four-choice mapping tasks proved to be extremely difficult as 
indicated by error rates close to chance level. Therefore, we decided to simplify these tasks by only using reversed mapping 
conditions throughout (necessarily so in the two-response tasks). 
 
Table 2 Task Pairs Used to Measure the Five Proposed Shifting Components 
Variant Description Adapted from Response keys 
Judgment shifting 
Two-Choice A Classify a digit according to its parity (odd or even) or 
magnitude (smaller or greater than 5). 
Logan and Bundesen (2003) arrow-down: even or smaller than 5; arrow-up: odd or 
greater than 5 
Two-Choice B Classify line drawing of an object or animal (Snodgrass 
and Vanderwart, 1980; Szekely et al., 2004) according 
to its animacy (living or non-living) or airworthiness 
(able to fly or not). 
Mayr and Kliegl (2000)a arrow-left: living or airworthy; arrow-right: non-living or 
nonairworthy 
Three-choice Classify a colored shape according to its shape or 
color. 
Mayr and Kliegl (2000) 1: circle or red; 2: triangle or green; 3: square or blue 
Four-choice Identify the position of a black dot when mentally 
moving it to the next corner within a rectangle either in 
clockwise or counterclockwise direction. 
Mayr (2002) 1: bottom left; 3: bottom right; 7: top left; 9: top right 
Dimension shifting 
Two-Choice A For digits made up of multiple small digits, classify 
either the large digit (global) or the small digits (local) 
as odd/even. 
R. Hübner et al. (2001) arrow-up: odd; arrow-down: even 
Two-Choice B For strings consisting of a digit (2 or 3) and a letter (A 
or B) separated by three “#” symbols (e.g., “A###2”), 
identify the digit’s or letter’s position. 
Bisiacchi et al. (2009) arrow-left: left; arrow-right: right 
Three-choice For vertically arranged combinations of a colored letter 
and a colored digit, identify the letter’s or digit’s color. 
Rey-Mermet and Meier (2014) 1: red; 2: green; 3: blue 
Four-choice For four rectangles arranged in a square, identify the 
position of the rectangle deviating in orientation or in 
size. 
Mayr and Keele (2000) 1: bottom left; 3: bottom right; 7: top left; 9: top right 
Mapping shifting 
Two-Choice A Classify the color of simple shapes. Meiran (1996) arrow-left: green; arrow-right: red (and reverse) 
Two-Choice B Decide whether two simultaneously presented fractal 
images are the same or different 
von Bastian and Oberauer 
(2013) 
arrow-left: same; arrow-right: different (and reverse) 
Three-choice Classify a word as city, river, or country von Bastian and Oberauer 
(2013) 
8: city; 5: country; 2: river (and reverse) 
Four-choice Identify the mathematical symbol presented. Duncan (1978) V: ÷; b: x; n: -; m: + (and reverse) 
Response set shifting 
Two-Choice A Classify a letter (A, E, O, U, B, G, R, or S) as a 
consonant or vowel. 
Rogers and Monsell (1995) v (vowel) and b (consonant), or 1 (vowel) and 4 (consonant) 
Two-Choice B Decide whether a smiley is shown in the top or bottom 
of two vertically arranged squares. 
Meiran (1996, 2000a) 9 (top) and 1 (bottom), or 7 (top) and 3 (bottom) 
Three-choice Classify the type of filling of a circle.  a (black), s (grey), and d (none), or 2 (black), 5 (grey). And 
8 (none) 
Four-choice Identify the color of the letter X. Kunde (2001) g (red), zb (green), h (blue), and b (yellow), or 1 (red), 7 
(green), 9 (blue), and 3 (yellow) 
Stimulus set shifting 
Two-Choice A Classify either a shape (triangle, diamond, circle, or 
ellipse) or a mathematical symbol (√, ±, ∞, ≈) as round 
or angular. 
Druey (2014) arrow-up: round; arrow-down: angular 
Two-Choice B For strings of five letters or symbols, decide whether 
the characters at the second and fourth positions are the 
same or different. 
Bisiacchi et al. (2009) arrow-left: same; arrow-right: different 
Three-choice Identify the position of a letter (A, B, or C) or digit (1, 
2, or 3) in terms of its natural order. 
Karle et al. (2010) 1: first; 2: second; 3: third 
Four-choice In a display of four flowers or cars arranged in a 
square, identify the position of the one with a color 
deviating from the others. 
 1: bottom left: 3: bottom right; 7: top left; 9: top right 
 
Note: All number keys used refer to the numeric keypad. Stimuli were presented individually where not noted otherwise. 
a Only animacy task. b Corresponds to Y on English QWERTY keyboards. 
 
RTs to correct responses and switch costs served as dependent measures. Switch costs were based on the log-
transformed RTs to correct responses, thereby avoiding general speed or scaling effects driving the relationships 
between components (cf. Meiran, 1996; Ratcliff, 1993). As log-transformed switch costs can suffer from 
problems inherent to difference scores such as lower reliability (e.g., Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Edwards, 2001), 
we additionally ran all analyses with the individual studentized residuals from a linear regression model 
predicting the switch RTs from the repetition RTs (cf. Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Oberauer, 2014). These analyses 
led to the same conclusions as those based on log-transformed switch costs (see supplemental materials for the 
detailed results; see Lo& Andrews, 2015, for a detailed discussion on potential benefits and disadvantages of RT 
transformations). 
 
Results 
 
Data Preprocessing 
 
RTs of wrong responses and RT outliers were excluded from the analyses. Outliers were defined as RTs three 
median absolute deviations away from the overall mean (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013). Following 
these procedures, M = 11.30% of trials (SD = 2.46%; range: 5.82% to 14.48% for the individual tasks) were 
excluded (see Appendix, Table A2, for descriptive statistics of the error rates). To eliminate unwanted variance 
caused by the two orders of test administration, one order was arbitrarily chosen as reference condition whereas 
the data from the other order was corrected by subtracting the differences in means between the two orders for 
each variable (cf. von Bastian & Oberauer, 2013; von Bastian, et al., 2016). All analyses were based on order-
corrected RTs and error rates. The data are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/u8bh2). 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
First, we tested whether all shifting tasks elicited significant switch costs. For this purpose, we ran paired t tests 
for each task comparing RTs in switch to RTs in repetition trials. As listed in Table 3, most tasks yielded 
significant effects of switching, with two exceptions: the judgment switching Four-choice task, and the stimulus  
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for and Effects of Switching on Raw Response Times 
 Switch Repetition    
Task M SD M SD Effect [95% CI] t(118) p 
Judgment 
2A 1,161 240 838 150 323 [294, 352] 22.00 <.001 
2B 910 196 773 147 137 [117, 158] 13.19 <.001 
3 1,215 226 905 188 310 [280, 341] 20.38 <.001 
4 1,346 350 1,334 351 12 [-9, 33] 1.15 .252 
Dimension 
2A 1,453 47 1,244 349 209 [181, 238] 14.40 <.001 
2B 720 169 668 165 53 [40, 66] 8.05 <.001 
3 1,582 302 1,425 305 157 [122, 192] 8.92 <.001 
4 853 209 774 188 80 [63, 96] 9.36 <.001 
Mapping 
2A 1,013 225 730 142 283 [255, 310] 20.46 <.001 
2B 1,135 285 917 175 218 [187, 249] 13.81 <.001 
3 1,268 247 1,093 190 174 [149, 199] 13.85 <.001 
4 1,311 280 1,007 222 304 [276, 332] 21.77 <.001 
Response set 
2A 1,023 223 725 113 298 [270, 326] 20.95 <.001 
2B 990 252 906 218 85 [66, 102] 9.11 <.001 
3 1,074 214 920 2016 154 [132, 176] 13.83 <.001 
4 1,339 252 1,247 295 92 [62, 122] 6.10 <.001 
Stimulus set 
2A 564 70 553 63 11 [6, 17] 4.44 <.001 
2B 627 77 627 72 -1 [-5, 4] -.35 .728 
3 545 57 521 50 25 [20, 30] 9.78 <.001 
4 552 88 543 109 10 [4, 16] 3.16 .002 
 
Note: 2A = Two-Choice A; 2B = Two-Choice B; 3 = three-choice; 4 – four-choice. 
set switching Two-Choice B task. These two tasks were therefore excluded from further analyses.3 
 
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for log-transformed switch costs are presented in Table 4 (including the 
excluded tasks for completeness). Most included tasks showed acceptable reliabilities (≥ = .66), except for 
mapping three-choice (α = .48), and stimulus set Two-Choice A (α = .40). In addition, most between-tasks zero-
order correlations (see Table 5) within each proposed shifting type were significantly positive, with only one 
exception (response set Two-Choice B). Performance in this task also showed no significant positive correlation 
with any other task (and also did not load significantly on the later modeled response set factor). As we realized 
only post hoc, the response set Two-Choice B task pair differed qualitatively from all other task pairs in this 
component in that it was the only one involving spatially overlapping response sets. Given these considerations, 
we decided to exclude this task from further analyses. However, including this task yielded qualitatively the 
same results and led to the same conclusions.4 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for Log-Transformed Switch Costs 
Task M SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Reliabilitya 
Judgment 
2A -.31 .14 -.60 .11 .20 -.13 .88 
2B -.15 .11 -.50 .07 -.73 .48 .86 
3 -.29 .13 -.73 .01 -.09 .07 .79 
4 -.01 .08 -.23 .22 .11 .37 .41 
Dimension 
2A -.16 .11 -.51 .10 -.32 .29 .70 
2B -.07 .08 -.27 .20 -.02 .34 .79 
3 -.12 .11 -.48 .16 -.34 .19 .75 
4 -.09 .09 -.32 .19 -.02 .30 .78 
Mapping 
2A -.32 .13 -.72 .00 -.51 .75 .86 
2B -.20 .11 -.51 .02 -.54 .02 .81 
3 -.14 .08 -.52 .03 -1.11 2.63 .48 
4 -.25 .10 -.54 -.01 -.11 .03 .66 
Response set 
2A -.32 .12 -.67 -.09 -.70 .37 .89 
2B -.08 .09 -.35 .12 -.51 .50 .73 
3 -.16 .11 -.42 .18 .38 .02 .78 
4 -.09 .11 -.33 .27 .43 .25 .69 
Stimulus set 
2A -.02 .04 -.15 .08 -.20 -.02 .40 
2B .00 .04 -.09 .10 -.07 .34 .40 
3 -.04 .05 -.18 .08 -.21 .14 .73 
4 -.02 .06 -.11 .23 1.62 3.61 .86 
 
Note: 2A = Two-Choice A; 2B = Two-Choice B; 3 = three-choice; 4 – four-choice; Min = minimum; Max = maximum. 
a Split-half reliability corrected using Spearman-Brown’s prophecy formula. 
 
 
                                                          
3 A tentative explanation for the absence of switch costs in the Four-Choice judgment switching task is that it was the only 
task that required an additional mental transformation of the stimulus displayed (i.e., mental rotation). Hence, the greater 
difficulty of this task may have obscured switch costs. As we administered a considerably lower number of (practice) trials 
than was the case in the original study (Mayr, 2002), it is possible that more trials would have allowed for switch costs to 
become manifest. 
4 For Model 1 to converge when including this task pair, its loading on the response set factor had to be fixed to zero, 
reflecting its low correlation with the other response set task pairs. 
  
Table 5 Between-Tasks Correlations of Log-Transformed Switch Costs 
 Judgment Dimension Mapping Response 
Stimulus 
set 
Task 2A 2B 3 2A 2B 3 4 2A 2B 3 4 2A 2B 3 4 2A 3 
Judgment 
2B .40                 
3 .40 .22                
Dimension 
2A .19 .26 .23               
2B .02 .00 .23 .02              
3 .03 -.02 .23 .32 .29             
4 .20 .09 .16 .17 .32 .28            
Mapping 
2A .18 .19 .11 .26 .15 .19 .23           
2B .27 .32 .27 .11 .05 .24 .07 .20          
3 .03 .17 .08 .21 .16 .25 .20 .15 .18         
4 .32 .23 .19 .13 .11 .20 .13 .26 .33 .27        
Response set 
2A .43 .29 .33 .12 .06 .18 .20 .24 .31 .17 .38       
2B .02 -.06 -.03 -.19 -.07 -.01 .01 -.01 .04 -.01 .02 .00      
3 .09 .29 .09 .16 .16 .09 .06 .22 .23 .11 .21 .30 -.05     
4 .19 .14 .00 .06 .14 .13 .08 .14 .12 .04 .24 .10 .07 .38    
Stimulus set 
2A -.03 -.01 .03 .13 -.09 .08 -.03 .23 .16 .06 .15 -.02 -.18 -.10 -.07   
3 .16 .04 -.05 .05 .11 .00 .02 .16 .01 .14 .09 .11 .00 .00 .21 .30  
4 -.09 -.08 .12 .10 .04 .02 .04 .05 -.01 -.06 .01 -.06 -.27 .07 -.01 .27 .03 
 
Note: Significant correlations (p < .05) are printed in bold. 2A – Two-Choice A; 2B = Two-Choice B; 3 = three-choice; 4 = 
four-choice. 
 
 
Structural Analyses 
 
To examine the structure of shifting factors, we ran latent-variable confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using the 
Lavaan package (Version 0.5–19, Rosseel, 2012) in R (Version 3.2.2, R Core Team, 2014). Model fit was 
evaluated examining the chi-square statistic (χ2), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
alongside its 90% CI and the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR). Conventional standards 
indicating good fit are values smaller than .06 for RMSEA and values less than .08for the SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). 
 
It would be desirable to additionally report the comparative fit index (CFI). The CFI compares the fit of the null 
model in which all covariances are fixed to zero (reflecting no communalities across tasks) to the fit of the 
current model. However, cases where the RMSEA of the null model is lower than .158 render the CFI 
noninterpretable (Kenny, 2015). We therefore examined the RMSEA of the null model using the semTools 
package (Version 0.4–14, Jorgensen et al., 2016) and found RMSEAnull = .124.5 Therefore,we refrained from 
reporting the CFI or other incremental fit indices. Nested models were compared by change in model fit 
assessed with chi-square difference tests. 
 
To establish a baseline model, we first evaluated the fit of the a priori theoretical model (consisting of five 
separate but correlated latent shifting factors) with the observed data. We then compared the fit of multiple 
alternative models to this baseline model. In the first series of comparisons, we examined the factors’ 
separability by reducing the number of latent factors toward full unity (i.e., a single factor), and by testing full 
diversity (i.e., five uncorrelated factors). Next, we investigated the extent to which unity and diversity may both 
be present in the shifting structure by evaluating a series of hierarchical and bifactor models. 
 
Theoretical baseline model. The proposed theoretical model with five correlated factors for judgment, 
dimension, mapping, response set, and stimulus set shifting resulted in χ 2 (110) = 136.50, p =  .044, RMSEA = 
                                                          
5 Note that the general fit of the null model was still poor, with χ2(136 ) = 384.65, p < .001, and significantly worse than that 
of the proposed theoretical baseline model, Δχ2 (26) = 248.14, p < .001. 
.045 [.008; .068], SRMR = .072 (see also Table 6). Hence, the model fit the data well according to the RMSEA 
and SRMR. As illustrated in Figure 5, all tasks loaded significantly on their respective factor, except the 
stimulus set Two-Choice A task. This task yielded a nonsignificant negative residual variance, which therefore 
had to be fixed to zero.6 Furthermore, correlations between the latent factors were generally significantly 
positive, except for the stimulus set factor, which was solely related to mapping. Finally, all latent factors 
exhibited significant variance, except for the dimension factor (p = .063).7 
 
 
Table 6 Fit Statistics for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models 
Model Description df χ2 p RMSEA [90% CI] SRMR 
1 Five correlated factors 110 136.50 .044 .045 [.008; .068] .072 
2a Four correlated factors, Mapping = Response Set 114 149.15 .015 .051 [.024; .072] .075 
2b Three correlated factors, Mapping = Response 
Set = Rule 
117 159.01 .006 .055 [.031; .075] .077 
2c Two correlated factors, Mapping = Response Set 
= Rule = Dimension 
119 175.72 .001 .063 [.042; .082] .081 
2d Unity (single factor)a 119 193.05 <.001 .072 [.053; .091] .085 
3 Full diversity (five orthogonal factors)b 121 222.71 <.001 .084 [.066; .101] .143 
4a Second-order factor with five first-order factors 115 150.41 .015 .051 [.024; .072] .075 
4b/4c Second-order factor with four first-order factors 116 150.41 .017 .050 [.022; .071] .075 
4d Second-order factor with three first-order factors 117 151.02 .019 .049 [.021; .071] .075 
4e Second-order factor with two first-order factors 118 159.04 .007 .054 [.029; .075] .078 
5a Common shifting factor with two uncorrelated 
specific factorsc 
113 146.00 .020 .050 [.021; .071] .073 
5b Common shifting factor with one uncorrelated 
specific factorc 
117 164.01 .003 .058 [.035; .078] .078 
 
Note: The comparative fit index is not reported as it cannot be interpreted because of null model’s root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) of <.158. 
a Different than for the other models, the residual variance for the Two-Choice A set shifting task was set to vary freely. 
bFitting resulted in a negative(but nonsignificant) residual variance for the three-choice response set shifting task, which was 
therefore fixed to zero. cFitting resulted in a negative (but nonsignificant) residual variance for the Two-Choice A judgment 
shifting task, which was therefore fixed to zero. 
 
 
Separability of Shifting Factors 
 
After having established the baseline model illustrated in Figure 5, we examined whether fewer factors were 
sufficient to reflect the structure of shifting. For this purpose, we combined the factors ordered by the size of 
their covariance. We started with the mapping factor, because switching of the exact stimulus–response 
mappings is an inherent feature across all types of the included shifting tasks (except those representing the 
dimension shifting component), and combined it with the response set factor (Model 2a in Table 6). However, 
                                                          
6 The negative residual variance was possibly caused by its low reliability or by this task correlating moderately with both 
the three-choice (r = .30) and four-choice variant (r = .27), whereas the latter two tasks were unrelated (r = .03). This pattern 
may reflect a larger overlap in required processes for the Two-Choice A and the three-choice variant, but a larger overlap in 
material domain between the Two-Choice A and the four-choice variant. More specifically, the Two-Choice A and the three-
choice stimulus set shifting tasks require participants to apply an additional (but, in contrast to the Judgment switching tasks, 
constant) semantic classification rule (i.e., the contour or the natural order, respectively), whereas perception-based 
identification of the deviant item is sufficient in the four-choice task. However, both the Two-Choice A and the four-choice 
tasks use nonverbal stimulus sets, whereas the three-choice task uses verbal–numerical stimulus sets. The negative residual 
variance was eliminated by fixing it to zero. 
7 The zero-order correlations between task pairs (see Table 5) suggest that the shared variance between the dimension task 
pairs may have turned out nonsignificant due to the very low correlation between the Two-Choice A and the Two-Choice B 
task. Indeed, exploratory analyses, in which each task was stepwise removed from the model, showed that the variance of the 
dimension factor was significant when either of the task pairs had been excluded, with slightly better fit without the Two-
Choice A task pair. All analyses reported were therefore also performed without the Two-Choice A task, which yielded 
largely identical results with only a few exceptions. First, fit indices revealed generally better fit when excluding this task 
pair (e.g., for Model 1: χ2(95) = 111.21, p = .123, RMSEA = .038 [.000; .064], SRMR = .068). Second, the correlation 
between judgment and dimension shifting dropped to .27 and was nonsignificant (p ≥ .066) in Models 1 and 2a. The results 
of the model comparisons, however, were the same independent of whether the Two-Choice A task pair was excluded or not. 
Model 2a’s fit indices were overall worse, χ2(114) = 149.15, p = .015, RMSEA = .051 [.024; .072], SRMR = 
.075, with Model 1 fitting the data significantly better, Δχ2(4) = 12.65, p = .013. Therefore, we did not expect to 
find that the following models combining mapping, response set, and judgment (Model 2b), mapping, response 
set, judgment, and dimension (Model 2c), or the full unity model (Model 2d8) would yield better fit, but listed 
them for completeness in Table 6.Similarly, full diversity (i.e., five uncorrelated factors, Model 3) resulted in a 
poor fit. Taken together, based on this series of model comparisons, the theoretical baseline model resulted in 
the best fit. In this model the five factors were significantly correlated, except for Stimulus Set shifting, which 
was solely related to mapping shifting. 
 
 
Figure 5 Five-factor measurement model of shifting (Model 1). Bold numbers indicate significance (p < .05), standard errors 
are given in parentheses. All latent factor variances were significant (p < .05) except for the dimension factor (p = .063). 
 
Unity and Diversity of Shifting 
 
Given that four of the five factors correlated at least moderately well, we tested whether an underlying common 
shifting process could be captured by a general shifting factor (gShifting). 
 
Second-order factor model. In this series of models, we conceptualized gShifting as hierarchical second-order 
factor with loadings from all five factors. The first model (Model 4a) resulted in an acceptable fit, 
χ2 (115) = 150.41, p = .015, RMSEA = .051 [.024; .072], SRMR = .075. As Mapping loaded on gShifting with .99, 
we set the Mapping tasks to load directly on gShifting, resulting in Model 4b. To account for the observation 
that Stimulus Set shifting was only correlated with Mapping but none of the other factors, we modeled Stimulus 
Set shifting to covary with instead of loading on gShifting (Model 4c), resulting in a mathematically identical 
model. The fit of Models 4b/c was acceptable, χ2 (116) = 150.41, p = .017, RMSEA = .050 [.022; .071], SRMR 
= .075, and statistically indistinguishable from Model 4a’s fit, Δχ2(1) < 0.01, p = .932. Hence, Model 4b/c was 
retained. Whereas the loadings of both the judgment and the dimension shifting factors on gShifting were of a 
medium size and resulted in significant residual variance, the response set shifting factor’s loading on gShifting 
was high (.91) and its residual variance nonsignificant (p = .416). Therefore, we tested whether a separate 
response set factor was appropriate by setting the response set tasks to load directly on gShifting. The fit of this 
Model 4d was again acceptable, χ2 (117) = 151.02, p = .019, RMSEA = .049 [.021; .071], SRMR = .075, and 
                                                          
8 As all tasks were loading on a single factor, the previously fixed residual variance for the Two-Choice A set shifting task 
could be set to vary freely. 
not significantly different from the fit of Model 4b/c, Δχ2(1) = 0.61, p = .435. Thus, as the fuller Model 4b/c did 
not yield significantly better fit than the more restricted Model 4d, the latter was retained (see Figure 6). Next, 
we compared Model 4d with a Model 4e in which the Judgment shifting tasks were also set to load directly on 
the gShifting factor. Although the model fit was still acceptable, χ2 (118) = 159.04, p = .007, RMSEA = .054 
[.029; .075], SRMR = .078, it was significantly worse than for Model 4d, Δχ2(1) = 8.01, p = .005. Hence, in this 
series of second-order factor models, Model 4d was the best fitting one. However, its fit was still significantly 
worse than that of the theoretical baseline model (Model 1), Δχ2(7) = 14.52, p = .043. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Hierarchical model with a general shifting second-order factor and loadings from two first-order factors (Model 
4d). Bold numbers indicate significance (p < .05), standard areas are given in parentheses. Variances of general shifting and 
stimulus set shifting were significant (p ≤ .030). 
 
Bifactor model. Model 4d can also be conceptualized as a bifactor model, with all tasks (except for the 
stimulus-set shifting tasks) loading on gShifting, and the judgment and dimension shifting tasks additionally 
loading on judgment-specific and dimension-specific factors (for similar approaches, see Friedman et al., 2008; 
van der Sluis, et al., 2007). Model 5a (see Figure 7) fitted the data similarly well, χ2(113) = 146.00, p = .020, 
RMSEA = .050 [.021; .071], SRMR = .073, with no significant difference in fit in comparison to Model 4d, 
Δχ2(4) = 5.03, p = .285. Figure 7 illustrates that despite the reasonable fit, the judgment-specific factor was 
mainly defined by the judgment Two-Choice A shifting task, the variance of which had to be fixed to zero. 
Furthermore, the dimension shifting tasks did not load equally well on the gShifting and the dimension-specific 
factor. Therefore, we additionally explored Model 5b omitting the dimension-specific factor which, however, 
resulted in significantly poorer fit than Model 5a, Δχ2(4) = 18.01, p = .001, and was therefore discarded. Next, 
Model 5a was compared with the theoretical baseline model, showing that the bifactor model fit significantly 
worse than the correlational model, Δχ2(3) = 9.49, p = .023. 
 
Alternative models 
 
We also tested alternative factor structures in which the tasks were grouped by the number of response options 
(i.e., consisting of factors two-choice, three-choice, and four-choice tasks) or by material (i.e., verbal and 
nonverbal materials). However, both factor models yielded inadmissible solutions due to inseparable factors 
(i.e., the three-choice factor was inseparable from the two-choice and the four-choice factor, as were the two 
material factors). We therefore had to discard these models. 
 
Final Model 
 
In summary, Model 1 (see Figure 5) with five correlated factors presented the best fit to the data. In this model, 
shifting between mappings showed most commonality with shifting between response sets. Despite being 
relatively strongly related (coefficient estimate = .89), nested model comparisons suggested that mapping and 
response set still represented separable factors. Whereas shifting between sets correlated only with shifting 
between mappings, all other types of shifting were at least moderately interrelated, with coefficient estimates 
ranging between .34 and .89. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Bifactor model with a general shifting factor and two uncorrelated factors to reflect specific variance for judgment 
and dimension shifting (Model 5a). Bold numbers indicate significance (p < .05), standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Numbers in italics refer to loadings (alongside their respective standard errors) on the specific factors. All latent factor 
variances were significant (p < .05) except for the dimension factor (p = .485). 
 
Discussion 
 
In this study, we took an individual differences approach to investigate the ability of shifting between mental 
sets. On the basis of an extension of Kleinsorge’s structural-hierarchical model of task set (2004; Kleinsorge & 
Heuer, 1999), we examined whether the 20 task pairs we adapted from the task-switch literature loaded on the 
five proposed components of mental set shifting (i.e., judgment, dimension, mapping, response set, and stimulus 
set shifting). Moreover, we examined how these components were interrelated on the latent-factor level. Finally, 
we examined whether a common factor could account for considerable shared variance between the five 
components, reflecting a general under-lying shifting ability. 
 
Key Findings 
 
Most of the tasks we selected indeed loaded on the proposed shifting components we assigned them to. 
Moreover, the majority of task pairs produced significant switch costs with relatively high reliabilities, thereby 
providing a good basis for modeling the factorial structure of shifting. Model comparisons showed that four of 
the five components were closely related but still separable. The fifth component, stimulus set shifting, was 
related to the mapping component only. Regarding the question whether there is a general shifting factor 
reflecting a common underlying ability, the answer is more complex. In the best fitting models of these series, 
the mapping and response set tasks loaded directly on the gShifting factor, with additional factors being required 
for judgment, dimension, and stimulus set shifting tasks. Note, though, that these models, despite providing 
reasonable accounts for the data, nevertheless fit worse than the baseline model, thereby justifying the omission 
of a common gShifting factor. 
 
In the following, we consider the results of our study and their implications in more detail. These concern 
theoretical implications, limitations, and recommendations for future investigations of shifting abilities. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
One crucial aspect of our results is the central role of the Mapping component. It was strongly correlated with 
every other component and indistinguishable from the higher-order gShifting factor in the hierarchical and 
bifactor models. From a purely methodological viewpoint, this finding is not that surprising, as shifts of the SR-
mappings were required for the tasks in all components in case of a task switch (except for dimension shifting, 
see Figure 2). Conceptually, though, the hierarchy of shifting components resulting from our individual 
differences approach and the hierarchy of the task-set features in the framework of Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999; 
Kleinsorge, 2004) reflect two different perspectives on the same phenomenon. Whereas Kleinsorge and Heuer 
(1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) took a functional perspective guided by the order of selection processes in a task-
switch situation, we took a structural perspective, focusing on individual differences in the shifting components 
and their relationships. From a functional viewpoint, the judgment is selected first, which then determines the 
relevant stimulus dimension(s) and the (set of) relevant mappings. Last, the response is selected based on the 
selected mappings. From our structural perspective, the mapping component is the most central one, reflecting 
that mapping switches are immanent to most of the shifting components. Despite these differences in 
perspective, the shifting components derived from the framework of Kleinsorge (2004) and Kleinsorge and 
Heuer (1999) still reflected essential aspects of mental set shifting in our individual differences approach. 
 
A second important conceptual implication pertains to the good fit of our results with Oberauer’s (2009) 
proposed theoretical framework of procedural working memory, in which the ad hoc mapping and unmapping 
of input (i.e., a stimulus) to output (i.e., a response) information is essential for goal-directed and flexible 
cognition. More specifically, Oberauer (2009) suggested that the switch costs observed in task-switch studies 
are mainly due to the required switching back and forth between different sets of SR-mappings in working 
memory, thereby rendering these mappings the core feature of task sets. Our results support the notion that 
mapping shifting reflects an essential aspect of the general shifting ability. 
 
Furthermore, we found that the response set shifting component is also highly related to all other components 
with the exception of stimulus set shifting. One important aspect to note when comparing our response set 
shifting component to the response task feature of Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) is that there 
is an essential conceptual difference: Whereas Kleinsorge and Heuer (1999; Kleinsorge, 2004) conceptualize the 
response level primarily in terms of the individual motor responses, we are dealing with response sets, that is, 
chunks of responses belonging to or even making up individual tasks. Future research will have to clarify how 
the different response-level conceptualizations are related with respect to the hierarchical organization of task 
sets. 
 
In addition, two of our findings may have implications for the processes involved in mental set shifting (i.e., the 
functional task-switch perspective): the relatively weak relationship between the judgment and dimension 
components and the isolated role of stimulus set shifting. First, regarding the relationship between the judgment 
and dimension components, although switching between dimensions is immanent in all of the judgment 
component’s task pairs, the dimension component’s correlation with the Judgment component was significant 
but unexpectedly low. This suggests that separate processes may be involved in the selection of judgments and 
stimulus dimensions, an explanation in line with a previous study by R. Hübner, Futterer, and Steinhauser 
(2001) that revealed additive effects for concurrent judgment and dimension switches. However, some caution is 
required when relating the two results. Whereas we focused on trial-by-trial switch costs, R. Hübner et al. 
(2001) focused on mixing costs (i.e., the costs arising when comparing performance for a given task in the 
repetition trials of switch blocks with the performance of that same task in nonswitch blocks). Thus, it has yet to 
be confirmed whether similar additive effects would also arise in switch costs before final conclusions can be 
drawn about the functional nature of the relation between judgment and dimension shifting. 
 
Second, stimulus set shifting clearly differed from all the other components. It only correlated with the mapping 
component, which likely resulted from the stimulus set task pairs still requiring shifting the exact stimulus–
response associations. Consistent with previous findings from the literature on switching between tasks using 
univalent stimuli (e.g., Meiran, 2000b; Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001), we observed only small but 
significant and relatively reliable switch costs for three out of four Stimulus Set task pairs. At the same time, 
stimulus set shifting was related only weakly to a general shifting ability in the hierarchical and bifactor models. 
Therefore, the question arising here is what actually causes the costs under these conditions in the respective 
tasks. One possible explanation focuses on differences between visual-spatial and executive attentional 
processes. Miyake and colleagues (2000) noted that pure shifts of visual-spatial attention (i.e., alerting and 
orienting responses) are to be distinguished from “executive-oriented shifts” (p. 56), which involve different 
attentional brain networks (cf. Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner,2005). In stimulus set shifting 
tasks, switches of peripheral visual attention seem to be sufficient to successfully perform the tasks, and these 
shifts clearly produce much smaller costs than shifts of executive attention. This is most obvious when 
considering the role of the cues in these tasks. To perform well in stimulus set shifting, the cues can be 
completely ignored, which is not possible for the task pairs in the other components. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Although we think that the current study provides an important contribution to a better understanding of the 
mental set shifting ability, we assessed only shifting ability without considering its relation to other cognitive 
abilities such as other executive functions. However, the present study can serve as a basis for future research 
putting shifting ability into the wider context of cognitive performance. More specifically, shifting has often 
been found to show different or even opposing patterns of correlations with other cognitive abilities (e.g., fluid 
intelligence) than other but supposedly related executive functions such as working memory (e.g., Oberauer, 
Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2008; but see Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016, for a possible methodological 
explanation),or inhibition and common executive function (cf. Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Distinguishing 
between subcomponents of shifting when investigating cognitive individual differences may reveal differential 
patterns for the components, and hence provide a novel perspective on previous findings. Furthermore, such an 
approach could help determining which aspects of shifting constitute it as an ability separable from other 
abilities, and which components are inseparable from general speed (cf. Jewsbury, Bowden, & Strauss, 2016). 
 
Two further limitations to be considered relate to the chosen basic paradigm: For all tasks and components in 
this study, we relied on cued task switching. In future research, it will be necessary to show that the structure of 
shifting components as revealed in our study holds also for other switching paradigms such as alternating runs 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or voluntary task switching (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005). Moreover, to keep the 
study within reasonable time limits and because it was the first attempt to disentangle different shifting 
components, we only used a short CTI throughout. As different processes can be predominant when participants 
have time to prepare for an upcoming task switch (e.g., Meiran, 1996), future studies should compare the 
component structure for short and long CTI conditions. 
 
Finally, the sample size in the present study can be viewed as relatively modest. Simulation studies have shown 
that the sample size required for structural equation modeling depends on multiple factors, including the number 
of latent factors, the number of indicators, and the magnitude of factor loadings and correlations (e.g., Wolf, 
Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). Hence, although we attempted to model five latent factors, which increases 
sample size demands compared with models with fewer factors, the use of up to four tasks to indicate each 
factor in turn decreases the required sample size. Moreover, shifting factor loadings reported in previous studies 
with younger adults were typically at least moderate (e.g., average loading of .66 in von Bastian & Oberauer, 
2013), and correlations between factors measuring highly similar constructs can be expected to be high (e.g., .80 
to .92 among three working memory factors in Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer,2013). Accordingly, a Monte 
Carlo simulation using the simsem package (Version 0.5–14, Pornprasertmanit, Miller, Schoemann, Quick, & 
Jorgensen, 2016) with 10,000 iterations replicated in two artificial data sets showed that N = 120 yielded 
sufficient power (i.e., ≥ 80%) for a five-factor model with average factor loadings of .60 and factor correlations 
of .80. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulations run for the observed model revealed that power was still ≥ 80% 
for most estimates, except for the weak correlations between stimulus set shifting and the other components. 
Taken together, although the modest sample size in the present study appears to be more or less unproblematic 
for the overall pattern of results, further research with more statistical power is warranted to investigate the role 
of Stimulus Set shifting in more detail. 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Our results are informative not only with respect to the structural components of mental set shifting, but they 
also provide a perspective on previous and future research concerning the assessment of shifting abilities. As 
laid out in the Introduction, in most previous studies tasks have been used that mainly reflect Judgment shifting. 
In our view, this is not the best measure as it possibly covers at least two components simultaneously: 
Judgment-specific shifting processes and general shifting processes. On the basis of our results, for a more 
general examination of the shifting ability, we would suggest rather using mapping shifting tasks as they 
strongly correlate with all other shifting components and load most strongly on the gShifting factor in the 
hierarchical and bifactor models. Although, in principle, the same also holds for response set shifting, we would 
not recommend using response set shifting tasks as the correlations were generally lower than for the mapping 
shifting tasks. 
 
Finally, the results of the present study give rise to scepticism toward the frequent use of the TMT to assess 
shifting abilities, as it primarily resembles stimulus set shifting. However, this component was least well 
correlated with the other components and probably measures shifting visual-spatial attention rather than 
executive shifting ability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, our results demonstrate that judgment, dimension, map-ping, and response set shifting reflect 
interrelated yet separable aspects of shifting ability. Stimulus set shifting, however, is only related to mapping 
shifting, indicating that stimulus set shifting reflects rather specific aspects of shifting that are only little related 
to a general mental task set shifting ability. The mapping component was most strongly interconnected and was 
indistinguishable from a general second-order shifting factor. Therefore, we conclude that mapping shifting 
reflects the most general measure of mental set shifting and, thus, constitutes the most adequate component for 
future research focusing on set shifting abilities.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A 1 The Two Testing Orders Used in the Present Study 
Test order 1 Test order 2 
Shifting facet Task Shifting facet Task 
Block 1 Block 1 
Judgment Two-Choice A Dimension Two-Choice B 
Judgment Four-choice Dimension Three-choice 
Judgment Three-choice Dimension Four-choice 
Judgment Two-Choice B Dimension Two-Choice A 
Block 2 Block 2 
Response set Two-Choice A Mapping Two-Choice B 
Response set Three-choice Mapping Three-choice 
Response set Four-choice Mapping Four-choice 
Response set Two-Choice B Mapping Two-Choice A 
Block 3 Block 3 
Stimulus set Two-Choice A Stimulus set Two-Choice B 
Stimulus set Three-choice Stimulus set Four-choice 
Stimulus set Four-choice Stimulus set Three-choice 
Stimulus set Two-Choice B Stimulus set Two-Choice A 
Block 4 Block 4 
Mapping Two-Choice A Response set Two-Choice B 
Mapping Four-choice Response set Four-choice 
Mapping Three-choice Response set Three-choice 
Mapping Two-Choice B Response set Two-Choice A 
Block 5 Block 5 
Dimension Two-Choice A Judgment Two-Choice B 
Dimension Four-choice Judgment Three-choice 
Dimension Three-choice Judgment Four-choice 
Dimension Two-Choice B Judgment Two-Choice A 
 
 
  
Table A 2 Descriptive Statistics for Error Rates 
 Switch Repetition 
Task M SD M SD 
Judgment 
2A .04 .05 .02 .03 
2B .03 .03 .03 .03 
3 .05 .05 .04 .04 
4 .04 .06 .03 .06 
Dimension 
2A .07 .06 .05 .04 
2B .05 .04 .03 .03 
3 .09 .06 .08 .06 
4 .05 .04 .03 .04 
Mapping 
2A .09 .07 .03 .03 
2B .10 .06 .04 .04 
3 .07 .05 .04 .04 
4 .09 .06 .04 .04 
Response set 
2A .08 .06 .03 .03 
2B .07 .06 .04 .04 
3 .06 .05 .05 .04 
4 .05 .05 .05 .05 
Stimulus set 
2A .03 .03 .03 .03 
2B .03 .03 .04 .03 
3 .03 .03 .02 .02 
4 .01 .01 .01 .02 
 
Note: 2A = Two-Choice A; 2B = Two-Choice B; 3 = three-choice; 4 = four-choice. 
 
